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Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications:
Safety:
Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance
Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc.
Comfort (infotainment) to passengers:
Intelligent navigation
Multimedia, internet connectivity
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The line of sight is blocked and you trust only the location





































Most, if not all, applications rely on locations.
Research question:
How to improve location security?
What do we protect?
Right time, right ID, right location
Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS
What is ID?
A unique digital identity
Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity
What is location?
location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude>
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Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked.
What is threat model?
Dropping V Availability
Eavesdropping V Confidentiality
Modifying V Integrity + Confidentiality
Replaying V Integrity
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Digital signatures [Armknecht et al.(2007), Choi et
al.(2006)], etc.
Resource:
Radio signal [Suen & Yasinsac(2005), Xiao et
al.(2006)], etc.
Computational resources [Douceur(2002)], etc.
Identification [Piro et al.(2006)], etc.
Location confidentiality:
PKI [Choi et al.(2006), Hubaux et al.(2004), Raya et
al.(2006)], etc.
Location-based encryption
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The main contribution of this dissertation is:
To enhance location security in VANETs
Specifically,
1 Enabling location integrity
2 Ensuring location confidentiality
3 Including integrity and availability in location security
4 Enabling location availability
5 Reducing control overhead
6 Reducing response time
7 New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer
8 New Geolock can compute key dynamically

















Validate the tuple <time, ID, location>
Three sub-solutions:
1 Active integrity: strong assumption (radar, GPS,
transceiver)
2 Passive integrity: weaker assumption (GPS,
transceiver)
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Figure: GPS location. (xgps,ygps) is a measurement value of the
GPS coordinates.
For GPS: let measurement error ∆α = ∆x = ∆y , write

















(x − γ×cos(θ −∆θ))2 + (y − γ×sin(θ −∆θ))2 ≤ (∆γ)2 (2)
(x − γ×cos(θ + ∆θ))2 + (y − γ×sin(θ + ∆θ))2 ≤ (∆γ)2 (3)
θ : the detected angle; γ: the detected radius.
For the region FCGHDE:{
γ−∆γ ≤
√
x2 + y2 ≤ γ + ∆γ

































































Statistically remove and refine
Possible data sources:
Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range
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Mahalanobis distance (M-Distance) introduced by P. C.
Mahalanobis [Mahalanobis(1936)]





Let x : the sample mean vector;
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An intuitive explanation: the distance of a test point from the


















Outliers can change the value of mean and covariance.
We replace the mean x by the median x∗ and obtain
the robust covariance S.
S = ∑
n
i=1 K (‖xi −x∗‖)(xi −x∗)(xi −x∗)T
∑
n
i=1 K (‖xi −x∗‖)
, (6)
where ‖X‖= XV−1X T , K (u) = exp(−hu),
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The new M-distance Dri :
Dri =
√
{(xi −x∗)S−1(xi −x∗)T} (7)
Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers
For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of




The observations can be abandoned by using the
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General Integrity: Real World Solution
Data source:
Radar: Radar of observer
Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range
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Y: on-coming vehicle detection
Z: neighbor detection
The final estimation of location:






where the weights of
w1: radar detection
w2: on-coming vehicle detection
w3: neighbor detection
w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3
The accuracy of this solution is 94.7%
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For simulation, we find the location attackers out of all
vehicles.
Q-Q plot (Quantile-Quantile Plots) [Thode(2002)]
A commonly used tool in statistics to show the outliers.
Is a kind of graphical method for comparing two
probability distributions
Plots the two distributions’ quantiles against each other.
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Table: Parameters and Values
Parameters Values
Initial traffic density 30 vehicles/Km/lane
The length of the road L 3 Km
Average speed 60 km/h
The number of lanes 4/direction
The mean error µ 1 m
The deviation of error σ 1 m
Error ε 3 m
The sample size n 1000
# of neighbor outliers mn 8
# of opposite outliers mo 2
The weight for radar w1 0.5
The weight for opposite w2 0.3






























































QQ Plot of Reported Location versus standard normal













































Validate the tuple <time, ID, location>
Start with a homogenous model and strong
assumptions
Improve to a real world solution
Contributions:
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Denning’s GeoLock Table 2
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Figure: Decryption region snapshot (Decryption region is not
proportionally drawn)
Comparing our extension with a geoencryption
extension: Al-Fuqaha [Al-Fuqaha & Al-Ibrahim(2007)].
Al-Fuqaha added decryption region prediction




















Map area 3.2*3.2 Km2
Decryption area 100*100 m2
Traffic density 1500 vehicles/hour
Average speed 28 m/s
Acceleration range [0,2] m/s2
Initial acceleration 0 m/s2
Initial speed 25 m/s
















As expected, our algorithm can tolerate larger location
errors. DecryptionRatio =
No. of successful decryption

































GeoEncryption Decryption Ratio Vs. Overhead
As expected, our algorithm
Has smaller decryption error.

































Location is part of the key: GeoLock
Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key
Contributions:
New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer
New Geolock can compute key dynamically.
New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors.
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“Art is never finished, only abandoned."(Leonardo da Vinci)
Focused on studying location information security
CIA model
Location availability: A mobility and probability model in
VANET communication
Location integrity: The active, passive and general
models
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Putting The Work In Perspective
What remains to be done:
Cross layer issues
Extensive simulation
Integrate to other research, e.g. privacy
Optimization of the algorithm
Real traffic data import
Test bed implementation
Prototype design
Applying the research in real applications
Theory analysis of the transportation issues
Disaster evacuation


















1. Dangerous road features 1. Curve speed warning, 2 low bridge warning,
3. traffic lights violation warning
2. Abnormal conditions 1. Vehicle-based road condition warning, 2.
infrastructure-based road condition warning, 3.
visibility enhancer, 4. work zone warning.
3. Danger of collision 1. Blind spot warning, 2. lane change warning,
3. intersection collision warning, 4. forward/rear
collision warning, 5. emergency electronic brake
lights, 6. rail collision warning, 7. warning about
pedestrians crossing
4. Incident occurred 1. Post-crash warning, 2. incident recovery (in-
surance), 3. SOS service, 4. evacuate people
II. Public service 1.Support for authorities 1. Electronic license plate, 2. electronic driverslicense, 3. vehicle safety inspection, 4. stolen
vehicles tracking, 5. Emergency vehicle warning,
III. Improved driving 1. Enhanced Driving 1. Highway merge assistant, 2. left turn as-sistant, 3. cooperative adaptive cruise control,
4. cooperative glare reduction, 5. in-vehicle sig-
nage, 6. adaptive drivetrain management
2. Traffic Efficiency 1. Notification of crash, 2. intelligent traffic flow
control, 3. enhanced route guidance and naviga-
tion, 4. map download/update, 5. parking spot
locator service
IV. Entertainment
1. Mobile Services 1. Internet service provisioning, 2. instant mes-
saging, 3. point-of-interest notification
2. E-Commerce 1. Fleet management, 2. rental car processing,
3. area access control, 4. cargo tracking; 5. toll
collection, 6. parking/gas payment
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